In July, diplomats met in Geneva to confront one of the most difficult questions in global security: how to prevent conflict and weapons from spilling into outer space. However, they made only cautious progress. Procedural compromises and narrowed debates kept the process alive, but silences on key threats and limits on civil society participation underscored its fragility. Yet with convergence built into its 2026 agenda, the working group tasked with these questions still holds the potential to move from survival to substance — if states are willing to connect principles with practice.
The UN open-ended working group (OEWG) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) in all its aspects is one of the few fora where governments grapple with how to keep orbit peaceful and secure. Its mandate is broad — to develop rules of responsible behaviour and consider legally binding agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space — making it a rare venue for tackling the complexity of space security, from blurred civilian–military uses, to the rise of commercial actors and counterspace capabilities. More than 50 states took the floor in July, showing strong interest, but progress remained hampered by procedural wrangling and political tug-of-war.
Expectations were low. The April session had collapsed into deadlock over the agenda, program of work and participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), leaving no space for substantive debate. Many feared July would be the same. Instead, after one day of procedural sparring, the session moved forward. There were no fireworks and no breakthroughs, but in today’s polarized climate, even a subdued conversation that kept the process alive was notable.
Compromise and Constraint
The most consequential outcome of the July session was agreement to move forward with a two-track structure: one track considering possible legally binding obligations, the other considering voluntary measures such as norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour.
This compromise kept both camps at the table: China, Russia and many Global South states pressing for a treaty-based approach; Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, the United Kingdom and others emphasizing voluntary norms. Both preferences were protected in the program of work.
But this survival strategy came at a cost. Many issues, from the threat or use of force to intentional destruction of space systems and the protection of critical civilian services, appear in both tracks. The outcome risks duplication rather than integration. Yet duplication has value: it keeps both sides engaged, ensures conversations continue and leaves open the possibility that legal and voluntary measures might eventually be linked.
Consensus may be preserved, but at the risk of curtailing ambition in a domain where new realities demand more than repetition.
However, there are also signs that the scope of discussion may narrow. In the previous OEWG on reducing space threats, debates over how international law applies — especially article IX of the Outer Space Treaty (the “due regard” principle) — were central to building momentum on shared norms. This time, Russia insisted that such interpretation amounted to unacceptable “revision” of international law and fell outside the mandate. China reinforced this view, stressing that the group should focus on legality/illegality, not “responsible behaviour.”
Others pushed back. The United Kingdom, Austria and the Netherlands argued that interpretation is not revision but a necessary part of international legal practice: without shared understandings of key terms, the risk of miscalculation in orbit will only grow.
The result was a process that survived by duplicating its agenda while continuing to struggle over the “all aspects” mandate. Consensus may be preserved, but at the risk of curtailing ambition in a domain where new realities demand more than repetition.
Civilian Protection and Commercial Harm
One of the clearest effects of this divided approach is the continued circling of whether and how international humanitarian law (IHL) should be part of the discussion. Most states affirm that international law — including IHL — governs activities in outer space. Some states have long argued that acknowledging IHL risks normalizing space as a warfighting domain. In July, Russia went further, suggesting that article III of the Outer Space Treaty — which affirms that international law applies in space — should be read as applying only in peacetime, effectively carving out IHL.
Many states disagreed. Italy captured the prevailing view: “We do not share the view that the applicability of IHL to outer space may imply the legitimization of the use of force. Additional Protocol I makes clear that IHL cannot be construed as authorizing aggression or use of force inconsistent with the UN Charter.”
Civilian protection remains caught in a tug-of-war between the drive to justify targeting and the responsibilities imposed by international humanitarian law.
This is not an abstract legal quarrel. It is a proxy for deeper disagreements about the role of commercial actors in global security. Russia and Iran argued that commercial satellites supporting military operations could be considered legitimate targets. Few dispute such claims. However, as the UK, Austria, Canada, and the ICRC reminded delegates, targeting decisions also invoke the full obligations of IHL, including distinction, proportionality and precaution. Civilian protection is the core of the law.
And civilian harm in orbit is not hypothetical. In 2022, a cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network knocked out wind farms in Germany and cut off tens of thousands of civilian customers across Europe. GPS jamming has affected civilian aviation in South Korea. These examples underline how any damage to space systems quickly cascades into harm on Earth for civilians who rely on space systems for internet, navigation, banking, emergency response and humanitarian services. Yet civilian protection remains caught in a tug-of-war between the drive to justify targeting and the responsibilities imposed by IHL.
Participation Under Pressure
Another contraction was in observer participation. The OEWG is mandated to be “open” and “inclusive,” yet civil society access has been tightened. After April’s paralysis over NGO access, July moved forward under a narrow compromise: observers had to be pre-approved and were limited to a single statement on the last day of the session. Some delegates warned that observers must not “politicize” the group or “undermine” interstate discussions. One organization — the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich — was anonymously vetoed. It was participation on probation, not inclusion.
Several states pushed back. Samoa, with a small delegation and limited capacity, emphasized the value of NGO expertise. Ireland, South Africa and Switzerland likewise underscored civil society’s contribution, with Switzerland noting: “The participation of civil society organizations is of benefit to our discussions as they contribute to our global understanding of complex issues, thus guaranteeing an enlightened debate.”
Yet few NGOs attended, unwilling to risk resources for minimal engagement; only the International Committee of the Red Cross took the floor. The negative effects are clear: a forum meant to widen expertise instead narrowed it further, sending a signal that “open and inclusive” participation remains contested. More than a procedural detail, this sets a precedent that could spill into other arms control fora, reinforcing a trend of shrinking space for multi-stakeholder engagement and dialogue at precisely the moment when complex, technical issues demand it.
Building Blocks and Practical Pathways
Despite procedural differences and substantive divisions, states are not starting from scratch. Delegations repeatedly pointed to earlier consensus as building blocks for future progress: the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence-building measures, the 2023 UN Disarmament Commission recommendations on how to implement them, and the enduring prohibition on nuclear weapons in space enshrined in article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Together, these episodes demonstrate that agreement is possible and that confidence-building measures and voluntary norms can complement legal obligations.
Several states stressed that abstract commitments must also be linked to immediate, practical steps. Türkiye, for example, suggested notification and consultation mechanisms for high-risk manoeuvres, alongside expanded capacity building to ensure that all states — particularly developing countries — can participate effectively in space governance. Proposals like these point to a pathway between principle and practice, that these discussions do not have to remain aspirational but can be enacted through measures that build trust, reduce risks and prepare the ground for possible treaty commitments.
Still, some of the most pressing realities remain unspoken. The proposed US “Golden Dome” multi-defence system, with its potential space-based interceptors, was not mentioned by name, despite its relevance to both responsible behaviours and treaty debates. The US delegation itself was silent, save for one right of reply. Cislunar space was absent from the agenda altogether, and cyber vulnerabilities were often dismissed as “Earth problems,” despite their clear links to space security. These silences leave dangerous disconnects between Geneva’s cautious deliberations and the programs, doctrines and technologies shaping insecurity in orbit.
Toward Convergence
The OEWG’s program of work for 2026 offers a chance to move beyond cautious survival. In April and July, states will confront difficult but unavoidable topics: the intentional destruction of space systems, the protection of services critical to civilians and humanitarian operations, the prevention of weapons placement in orbit, and risks from proximity operations. These issues will be addressed both as possible legal obligations and as voluntary measures.
The overlap is not duplication for its own sake. By placing the same topics on both tracks, the agenda creates space for connection by encouraging states to explore where voluntary commitments and legal obligations reinforce one another. What began in July this year as a pragmatic compromise could, in practice, nudge the OEWG toward convergence.
But for the OEWG to matter, it must turn silences into substance. By building on past consensus, reinforcing abstract commitments with practical steps and confronting the realities driving insecurity in orbit, the OEWG can move from survival to progress. That will require keeping the process open and inclusive, connecting past commitments to present risks, and building bridges between law and practice, between state and non-state actors, between Earth and space, and between aspiration and action. Protecting civilians and preserving space as a stable domain of human activity depends on it.
